Neovisni, ali ne i neutralni

Teoretičari zavjere su (kako to uvijek biva) popušili - Radovan Karadžić izgleda nije sklopio pakt o trajnoj nekažnjivosti. Srpski izvori potvrdili su, a svjetske kuće prenijele da je bivši predsjednik Republike Srpske, šef Srpske demokratske strane i Vrhovni zapovjednik vojske bosanskih Srba (VRS) uhićen. Gdje i kako još nije poznato, no nema sumnje da će detalji biti zanimljivi, posebno oni koji se tiču njegovog više od desetljeća dugog skrivanja. Radovan Karadžić arhitekt je jednog on najbrutalnijih ekperimenata rasne čistoće u Europi koji je optužen za vrlo teška kaznena djela: genocid (najteže kazneno djelo u međunarodnom pravu), sudjelovanje u genocidu, istrebljenje, ubojstvo, namjerno usmrćivanje, progon, deportaciju, nehumane akte i druge zločine počinjene protiv bosanskih Muslimana, Hrvata i drugih ne-Srba u BiH.

Prema optužnici, Karadžić je zajedno s drugima (element koji će izmjenom optužnice biti obuhvaćen u "udruženi zločinački pothvat") činio zločine po BiH sa ciljem osiguravanja kontrole nad područjima BiH koja su proglašena srpskom republikom i značajnog smanjenja ne-srpskog pučanstva. Kako bi ostvarili taj cilj, koji je po međunarodnom pravu ilegalan, Radovan Karadžić i ostali su činili zločine kako bi se ne-Srbi natjerali da napuste ta područja, a one koji su nevoljko odlazili su protjerivali, dok su druge ubijali - radi se o poznatom obrascu koji je primjenjen u svim ratom zahvaćenim bivšim republikama SFRJ od svih zaraćenih strana. Ipak, Karadžić se za razliku od drugih mora suočiti s najtežom optužbom, ona za kazneno djelo genocida, tiče se ubojstva skoro 8,000 muslimanskih muškaraca i dječaka u Srebrenici 1995. Case protiv Karadžića ne počiva samo na zapovjednoj odgovornosti (kao Vrhovni zapovjednik koji nije učinio nešto što je trebao - kaznio ili spriječio da trupe nad kojima ima kontrolu čine zločine) nego uvelike i dokazivoj direktnoj odgovornosti za genocid (učinio nešto što nije trebao).

Naime, ono što tužiteljevu poziciju čini neobično jakom je školski primjer krunskog dokaza - Ured tužitelja ICTY posjeduje tzv. Direktivu broj 7 u kojoj Karadžić skoro eksplicitno kao cilj navodi nestanak muslimanske grupe. Karadžić naređuje

Complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica”.

Poslijednji dio samo treba usporediti s opisom jednog od načina počinjenja genocida iz Konvencije o genocidu

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

Najveći problem dokazivanja genocida je naime dokazivanje namjere uništenja zaštićene grupe (nacionalna, vjerska, rasna ili etnička grupa) jer ubojstvo velikog broja ljudi nije samo po sebi genocid ako su ta ubojstva recimo počinjena da bi se ljudi prognali, a ne da bi se uništila grupa. Holokaust je genocid ne zbog broja nego namjere (subjektivnog odnosa počinitelja prema kaznenom djelu) da se Židovi kao grupa naprosto unište. Direktiva br. 7 krunski je dokaz da je Radovan Karadžić imao namjeru uništiti vjersku odnosno etničku grupu u BiH. Nakon pronalaska oko 8,000 leševa koje su ostavile trupe kojima je Karadžić vrhovni zapovjednik, osuda za genocid je vrlo izgledna. Naravno, samo i jedino pod uvjetom da tužitelj ne odustane od te točke optužnice, a rizik za to postoji na temelju iskustva s Biljanom Plavšić koja je pristala na guilty plea (izjašnjavanje da je kriva) u zamjenu za odustajanje od točke optužnice za genocid. Blea barganing (pregovaranje o izjavi o krivnji) je dopušteno u anglosaksonskim sustavima (kao i nekim kontinentalnim, poput Italije) i našlo je svoje mjesto i na ICTY odnosno u međunarodnom pravu.

Karadžić je optužen i za osnivanje kampova i niz napada diljem gradova BiH, uključujući opsadu Sarajeva koja je bila jedna od najgnjusnijih vojnih kampanja uperenih protiv civilnog stanovništva koji su živjeli u nemogućim uvjetima pod prijetnjom snajpera, a što je rezultiralo ubojstvom i ranjavanjem tisuća ljudi.

Optužnica protiv Karadžića stara je osam godina. Nema sumnje da je u uredu tužitelja na ICTY već jučer počeo rad na izmjeni optužnice koja će uključiti točke za koje su dokazi prikupljeni u proteklih osam godina. Hoće li tužitelj čekati na Mladićevo uhićenje kako bi zatražio spajanje postupaka i uštedio sudske resurse vodeći jedan umjesto dva postupka za isti činjenični i pravni supstrat ovisi o obavještajnim podacima koje ima glede uhićenja Mladića. Ono što nije sporno je da će Karadžić završiti na ICTY koji ima primat nad nacionalnim pravosuđem i da će pred-raspravna i raspravna faza postupka trajati vrlo dugo - dovoljno dugo da nema govora o zatvaranju Tribunala najmanje idućih 5 godina. Bez obzira na gomilu dokaza, Karadžić mora dobiti fair trial (due process), a u ovako složenim slučajevima to znači da se postupak pretvara u maratonski proces koji će početi njegovim pojavljivanjem (Initial Appearance) pred vijećem gdje će se očitovati o krivnji.

Okosnica cijelog postupka je tekst koji slijedi u nastavku - optužnica protiv Karadžića, s potpisom omražene Carle del Ponte. Gotovo svaka riječ u ovom tekstu ispod mora biti dokazana van razumne sumnje gomilom dokumenata i svjedočenja kako bi se unijela osuda.

Pred Radovanom Karadžićem i međunarodnom pravdom je dugačak put koji je zapravo tek počeo.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

RADOVAN KARADZIC

AMENDED INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("the Statute of the Tribunal"), charges:

Radovan KARADZIC,

with GENOCIDE; CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR and GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, as set forth below

THE ACCUSED

1. Radovan KARADZIC was born on 19 June 1945 in the municipality of Savnik, presently Republic of Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2. Radovan KARADZIC was a founding member of the Serbian Democratic Party (hereafter SDS) which was established within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia and Herzegovina) on 12 July 1990. From 12 July 1990 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC was President of the SDS. In that capacity he also, inter alia, presided over meetings of the SDS Main Board.

3. Radovan KARADZIC is a long-standing associate of Momcilo KRAJISNIK, former President of the Assembly of Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnian Serb Assembly) and member of the National Security Council and expanded Presidency of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Serbian republic) and Biljana PLAVSIC, former member of the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting President of the Serbian republic, member of the Presidency of the Serbian republic and Vice- President of Republika Srpska.

4. Radovan KARADZIC became President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic on 27 March 1992.

5. Radovan KARADZIC, became a member of the three-member Presidency of the Serbian republic on 12 May 1992. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected President of the Presidency.

6. Radovan KARADZIC, together with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and other members of the SDS; served on the expanded Presidency of the Serbian republic from the beginning of June 1992 until 17 December 1992.

7. Radovan KARADZIC, along with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, was a member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Serbian republic from on or about the 30 November 1992.

8. Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika Srpska from 17 December 1992 until his resignation on 19 July 1996. From 20 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces presided over sessions of the Supreme Command.

COUNTS

9. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; participated in the below-charged crimes in order to secure control of those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the Serbian republic. Those areas include but are not limited to the municipalities of: Banja Luka; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Hadzici; Ilidza; Ilijas; Jajce; Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Novi Grad; Novo Sarajevo; Pale; Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Teslic; Trnovo; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Vogosca; Zavidovici; and Zvornik.

10. In order to achieve this objective, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, initiated and implemented a course of conduct which included the creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror tactics, that would have the effect of encouraging non-Serbs to leave those areas; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation of others.

11. Bosnian Serb forces including military, paramilitary, territorial defence and police units (hereafter Bosnian Serb forces), SDS and government authorities acting under the direction and control of Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were engaged in a variety of actions to significantly reduce the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of these municipalities.

12. From late March to 31 December 1992, Bosnian Serb forces seized physical control of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, often through violent attacks. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a co-ordinated and planned manner. Organisation and direction of the take-overs that occurred between late March and 31 December 1992 and the continuing acts of persecution and deportation that occurred up to 30 November 1995, in particular from the municipalities of Bijeljina, Banja Luka and the UN designated "safe area" of Srebrenica (hereafter Srebrenica enclave) and its surroundings, were provided by the SDS, military and police leadership, and the governing organs of Serb municipalities, including the Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions.

13. Between 1 April 1992 and 30 November 1995, Bosnian Serb forces were also engaged in a forty-four month attack of Sarajevo, which involved inflicting terror on persons living within Sarajevo.

14. Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces killed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, who had been captured in several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave.

15. By 30 November 1995, this course of conduct resulted in the death or forced departure of a significant portion of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb groups from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and in and around the Srebrenica enclave.

COUNTS 1-6
(GENOCIDE, COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, EXTERMINATION,
MURDER, WILFUL KILLING)

16. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in Counts 1-6.

17. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, acting individually or in concert with others, including Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, and between early March 1995 and 30 November 1995, acting individually or in concert with others, Radovan KARADZIC; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in several municipalities, including but not limited to: Bijeljina; Bratunac; Bosanski Samac; Brcko; Doboj; Foca; Ilijas; Kljuc; Kotor Varos; Novi Grad; Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski Most; Srebrenica; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Zavidovici; and Zvornik. The destruction of these groups in these municipalities was effected by:

1. the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats which took place during and after the attacks on and within the municipalities; the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in and after they had been taken away from camps and detention facilities; and the killing of Bosnian Muslims after their captivity in several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave;

2. the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during their confinement in camps and detention facilities, and during their interrogations at these locations, police stations and military barracks, where detainees were continuously subjected to, or forced to witness, inhumane acts including murder, sexual violence, torture, beatings and robbery; and

3. the detention of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in camps and detention facilities under conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part of those national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, more fully set out in Paragraph 30.

KILLINGS

18. The killings by Bosnian Serb forces during and after the attacks on and within these municipalities include, but are not limited to:

o the killing on or about 1-2 April 1992 of at least forty-eight Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in Bijeljina town - Bijeljina municipality;

o the killing on or about 7-8 May 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats at the Crkvina warehouse - Bosanski Samac municipality;

o the killing on or about 4 May 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males at the Hotel Posavina - Brcko municipality;

o the killing on or about 10 May 1992 of thirty-four Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat civilians of the village of Gornja Grapska - Doboj municipality;

o the killing on or about 1 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers from Jelec - Foca municipality;

o the execution on or about 5 June 1992 of eighteen Bosnian Muslim villagers from Ljesevo - Ilijas municipality;

o the execution on or about 30 May 1992 of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers of Prhovo, including women and children, and the mass execution on or about 1 June 1992 of over one hundred Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Velagici - Kljuc municipality;

o the killing on or about 13 August 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslim males of Dabovci village, and the killing in November 1992 of approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males of Grabovica village - Kotor Varos municipality.

o the killing on or about 23 July 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim villagers of Carakovo - Prijedor municipality;

o the killing on or about 25 May 1992 of more than thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat women and children in the village of Hrustovo - Sanski Most municipality;

o the execution throughout June 1992 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men, women and children of Visegrad at various bridges over the Drina, and the 14 June 1992 killing of more than sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers from Koritnik village -Visegrad municipality;

o the killing on or about 2 May 1992 of approximately twelve Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Drum, and the killing on or about 16 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children of the village of Zaklopaca - Vlasenica municipality;

o the killing on or about 25 June 1992 of twenty-one Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat civilians from Vozuca village - Zavidovici municipality;

o the killing on or about 9 April 1992 of fifteen Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the town of Zvornik - Zvornik municipality.

18. SDS and government authorities established camps and detention facilities in the municipalities. Following the attacks on the municipalities, Bosnian Serb forces rounded up tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and forced them to march to assembly points, for transfer to the camps and detention facilities. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were pulled from the columns during these marches and executed.

19. Many thousands of those Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who survived the attacks and forced marches were taken to these camps and detention facilities, including but not limited to:

o Manjaca in Banja Luka municipality, from about 21 April to 18 December 1992;

o Batkovic in Bijeljina municipality, from about 1 June to 31 December 1992;

o the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac municipality, from 1 May to 31 December 1992;

o Luka in Brcko municipality, from 7 May to early July 1992;

o Bare ammunition warehouse from 1 May 1992, Spreca prison from 1 May 1992, the SUP station from 1 May to 31 July 1992, Percin’s Disco from 1 May 1992, Sevarlije JNA barracks from 1 May to 30 June 1992, and the JNA hangars near the Bosanska plantation from May 1992, all in Doboj municipality;

o KP Dom in Foca municipality, from 18 April to 31 December 1992;

o Omarska from 15 May to 15 August 1992, Keraterm from 15 May to 6 August 1992, and Trnopolje from 15 May to 30 September 1992 in Prijedor municipality;

o Rasadnik/Sladara from 1 May to 31 December 1992 and Veljko Vlahovic School from 1 May to 31 August 1992, in Rogatica municipality;

o Betonirka from 27 May to 7 July 1992 in Sanski Most municipality;

o Susica from 2 June to early September 1992 in Vlasenica municipality;

o Celopek Dom Kultur from 29 May to 30 June 1992, Ekonomija Farm from about 7 May to 22 May 1992, Karakaj Technical School from 29 May to June 1992 in Zvornik municipality.

21. These camps and detention facilities were staffed and operated by military and police personnel, under the ultimate direction and control of senior Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, more fully set out in Paragraphs 60-66.

22. The killing by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats in these camps and detention facilities, or after they had been taken away from them, includes but is not limited to:

o the May 1992 summary execution of Bosnian Muslim detainees in Luka Camp - Brcko municipality;

o the killings through May and June 1992 of military aged Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat male prisoners from Susica camp - Vlasenica municipality;

o the killings in June 1992 of over thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croats male prisoners at the Celopek Dom Kultur; the mass killing on or about 1-5 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and sixty Bosnian Muslim males at Karakaj Technical School; the killing on or about 5-8 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat prisoners at Gero’s slaughterhouse - Zvornik municipality;

o the mass killing on or about 14 June 1992 of forty-seven Bosnian Muslim men from Rajlovac camp - Novi Grad municipality;

o the execution on or about 15 June 1992 of at least ten Bosnian Muslim males from Visegrad – Rogatica municipality;

o the execution on or about 20 July 1992 of over one-hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the "Brdo" region of Prijedor at Omarska camp; the execution on or about 24-25 July 1992 of approximately one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males in Room 3 of Keraterm camp; the mass execution on or about 21 August 1992 of approximately one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from Trnopolje camp on Vlasic mountain in Skender Vakuf – Prijedor municipality;

o the killing and repeated beating and torture over the month of July 1992 of thirty-six Bosnian Muslim detainees in Foca KP Dom; the killing on or about 5 August 1992 of over twenty Bosnian Muslim male detainees from Kalinovik municipality who were taken to Foca KP Dom, and from there later killed near Jelec - Foca municipality.

23. The 1992 take-overs, referred to in paragraph 12, gave the Bosnian Serb forces control of the majority of major municipalities in eastern Bosnia and the "ethnic cleansing" that followed and continued through 1993-1995, especially from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja Luka, forced the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of these municipalities to leave. The Bosnian Muslims mainly fled into the thinly populated rural areas of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina that had so far escaped the attention of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Bosnian Muslim populations within those areas, including Srebrenica, swelled dramatically.

24. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council of the UN acting pursuant to Chapter VII of its Charter, adopted Resolution 819, in which it demanded that all parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina treat Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo and Tuzla (and their surroundings) as "safe areas" which were to be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.

25. On 8 March 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, as Supreme Commander instructed the Bosnian Serb forces to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival of life for the inhabitants of, inter alia, Srebrenica.

26. On or about 6 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces shelled Srebrenica and attacked UN observation posts that were located in the "safe area". This attack on the Srebrenica "safe area" continued until 11 July 1995, when combined forces from several units of the Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica. The Bosnian Muslims who were in Srebrenica after the beginning on the attack took two courses of action in response.

1. One group of several thousand Bosnian Muslim men, women and children fled to the UN compound in Potocari, which was located within the "safe area" of Srebrenica. On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces separated the Bosnian Muslim men and boys from the women and children and detained them in and around Potocari. The women and children were later transported by buses and trucks to areas outside the enclave.

2. A second group of approximately 15, 000 thousands Bosnian Muslim men along with some women and children fled in a huge column, through the woods towards Tuzla. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the retreating column were captured by or surrendered to the Bosnian Serb forces.

27. Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces executed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men in an organised, widespread and systematic manner. In particular, those forces summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men at the places where they were detained shortly after they had been captured and at other sites to which they had been transported for execution.

28. These killings were committed at several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave, including but not limited to:

o the execution on or about the 12-13 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim men at diverse locations around the UN compound at Potocari;

o the killings on or about the 12 to 15 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim men at various locations in and around Bratunac;

o the execution on or about the 12 to 14 July 1995 of twenty-five Bosnian Muslim men near Tisca;

o the execution on or about the 13 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men who had been imprisoned in a large warehouse in the village of Kravica;

o the execution on or about the 14 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men at the Grbavci school complex and the nearby village of Orahovac (near Lazete) and ;

o the execution on or about the 14 to 15 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men in and around the "Dam" near Petkovci;

o the execution on or about the 14 to 21 July 1995 of over hundred Bosnian Muslim men along a dirt road in the Cerska Valley;

o the execution on or about the 14 to 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men at the school at Pilica;

o the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men at Branjevo Military Farm;

o the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of approximately five hundred Bosnian Muslim men inside the Pilica Cultural Centre;

o the execution on or about the 17 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men near Kozluk.

CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM

29. In the camps and detention facilities, referred to in paragraphs 20 and 22, Bosnian Serb forces and others who were given unrestricted access to the camps, subjected Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from the municipalities to physical and mental abuse, causing them serious bodily or mental harm. As a result of these inhumane acts, during the period from late March 1992 to 31 December 1992, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats died in these detention facilities.

CONDITIONS CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

30. Conditions in the camps and detention facilities included inadequate food, often amounting to starvation rations, foul water, insufficient or non-existent medical care, inadequate hygiene conditions and lack of space.

31. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

32. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 1: GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 2: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(e), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 3: Extermination, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(b), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 4: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 5: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 6: Wilful killing, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 7
(PERSECUTIONS)

33. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 16-32; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 38-41 and 67-92 in count 7.

34. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and the Srebrenica enclave. These persecutions included but are not limited to:

1. the killing by Bosnian Serb forces of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, during and after the attacks on the areas and municipalities listed in Paragraphs 17 and 18; in the camps and detention facilities as described in Paragraphs 20 and 22; and after their captivity in several different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave as described in Paragraph 28.

2. the forced transfer or deportation by Bosnian Serb forces of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non- Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, and Bosnian Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave;

3. the inhumane treatment and/or torture of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. During and after the attacks on these municipalities, whether they were taken to detention centers, police stations, military barracks, private homes or other locations, Bosnian Serb forces subjected Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serb civilians to brutal, inhumane treatment, which included beatings, sexual violence and death threats on a daily basis. Many were forced to witness executions and brutal assaults of other detainees;

4. the constant humiliation and degradation by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. In the detention facilities, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb males and females suffered egregious, inhumane conditions on a daily basis. Detainees were deprived of adequate nutrition, adequate medical care, hygienic sanitation facilities, and were forced to endure inhumane accommodations. The detainees subsisted in an atmosphere of constant terror fostered by random brutality. Physical violence, mental suffering, sexual violence and other degrading and humiliating circumstances that constituted fundamental attacks on their humanity were repeatedly inflicted upon the detainees;

5. the denial of fundamental rights by Bosnian Serb forces to Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, including the right to work, freedom of movement, the right to judicial process, and the right of equal access to public services including proper medical care;

6. the wanton destruction by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns and villages in the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. During and after the attacks on these municipalities, Bosnian Serb forces systematically destroyed Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns, villages and property, including homes, businesses and Muslim and Roman Catholic sacred sites. Buildings were shelled, torched or dynamited. The destruction was so extensive that nothing but portions of buildings and rubble remained in many of these municipalities. Buildings associated with the Serbian Orthodox religion remained untouched.

35. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraph 34 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

36. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraph 34 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 7: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(h), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 8-9
(DEPORTATION, OTHER INHUMANE ACTS)

37. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 33-36; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in counts 8-9.

38. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the forced transfer and deportation of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and the Srebrenica enclave.

39. From early April 1992, the organised forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 began. Between 1 January 1993 and 30 November 1995 the forcible transfers continued, especially from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja Luka.

40. Between 11 July 1995 and 18 July 1995 thousands of Bosnian Muslims were forcible transferred from the Srebrenica enclave. As a result of these actions the Bosnian Serb forces virtually eliminated the presence of any Bosnian Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave area, thus further continuing an "ethnic cleansing" campaign which had begun in early April 1992.

41. The Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and non-Serb groups were mainly deported to areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the internationally recognised government and to Croatia and Serbia. The forced transfers and deportations were organised by the Bosnian Serb police forces and other Bosnian Serb municipal organs operating at the direction of the Crisis Staffs. In many cases, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs were required to sign documents stating that they were turning over all of their property to the Bosnian Serb republic in order for Bosnian Serb authorities to allow them to leave or to release them from detention facilities.

42. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 38 through 41 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

43. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraph 38 through 41 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 8: Deportation, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(d), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 9: Other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(i), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 10
(UNLAWFULLY INFLICTING TERROR UPON CIVILIANS)

44. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 10.

45. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, individually or in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon the civilian population thereby inflicting terror upon its civilian population.

46. Shortly after Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognised as an independent state on 6 April 1992, armed hostilities broke out in Sarajevo. Even before the conflict began, armed forces supporting the SDS and elements of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (hereafter JNA) occupied strategic positions in and around Sarajevo. The city was subsequently subjected to blockade, bombardment and sniper attacks from these positions. Much of the bombardment and sniping was from positions in the hills around and overlooking Sarajevo, from which the attackers had a clear, detailed and commanding view of the city and its population.

47. On or about 20 May 1992, after a partial withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA forces surrounding Sarajevo were effectively transformed into the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Army of the Serbian republic.

48. For forty-four months, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps implemented a military strategy that used shelling and sniping to kill, maim, wound and terrorise the civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping killed and wounded thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages, including children and the elderly.

49. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps directed shelling and sniping at civilians who were tending vegetable plots, queuing for and collecting water or bread, attending funerals, playing and watching football, shopping in markets, riding on trams, gathering wood, or simply walking with their children or friends. People were injured and killed, even inside their own homes, hit by bullets targeted through their windows. The attacks on Sarajevo civilians were often unrelated to military actions and were designed to keep the inhabitants in a constant state of terror.

50. Because of the shelling and sniping against civilians, the life of every Sarajevo inhabitant became a daily struggle to survive. Without gas, electricity or running water, people were forced to venture outside to find basic living necessities. Each time they did, whether to collect wood, fetch water or buy some bread, they risked death. In addition to the sheer human carnage that the shelling and sniping caused, the endless threat of death and maiming caused extensive trauma and psychological damage to the inhabitants of Sarajevo.

51. Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control, were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

52. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 10: Unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 11
(TAKING OF HOSTAGES)

53. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 11.

54. Between 25 and 26 May 1995 air strikes were undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO) against Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

55. Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the taking of UN military observers and UN peacekeepers as hostages, following the NATO air strikes on 25 and 26 May 1995.

56. Bosnian Serb forces detained over two hundred UN peacekeepers and military observers in Pale, Sarajevo and other locations. They held them hostage by force at locations of strategic or military significance across Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to render these locations immune from further NATO airstrikes and to prevent the airstrikes from continuing. Some of the hostages were assaulted and otherwise maltreated during their captivity. Some of these hostages were forced to warn their UN commanders that they would be killed if NATO continued to bomb.

57. During and after protracted negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, the UN hostages were released in stages between 3 and 19 June 1995.

58. Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above, or had done so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

59. In addition, between 3 June 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:

Count 11: Taking of hostages, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

60. Radovan KARADZIC acting individually between 1 July 1991 and 19 July 1996, or in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992; exercised both formal and/or de facto power and control over the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment.

61. In particular, from 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, mainly through his positions as President of the SDS, including President of the Main Board; President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic and President of the Presidency of the Serbian republic, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others; directed and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:

1. Radovan KARADZIC was President of the SDS and in that capacity was also, inter alia, President of the Main Board of the SDS. Effectively the Main Board was the main authority within the party’s hierarchy; it formulated the party’s policies and ensured they were put into effect. The Main Board, of which Momcilo KRAJISNIK was also a member from 12 July 1991, and SDS leaders exercised direct control over the activities and policies of all levels of the SDS, including the municipal boards. The Main Board ordered the creation of the SDS Crisis Staffs in municipalities where Bosnian Serbs lived. The chairmen of the SDS municipal boards were frequently the Presidents of or members of the Crisis Staffs. Crisis Staffs included military and police officials amongst their members. Crisis Staffs exercised complete executive, legislative and regulatory authority in the areas under their control and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces.

2. From 28 February 1992 until 12 May 1992, Radovan KARADZIC acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were jointly responsible for the deployment of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence in peace and in war, and for the utilisation of the police in war and other emergency situations. This became particular evident when the Bosnian Serb Assembly created the National Security Council of the Serbian republic on 27 March 1992. Radovan KARADZIC became President of the Council and Momcilo KRAJISNIK one of its members. The stated function of the National Security Council was to consider political, legal, constitutional and other issues of interest for the security of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radovan KARADZIC was of the view that decisions of the National Security Council should bind all the executive organs, the police and the government, particularly in urgent situations where decisions had to be taken on war, peace and other matters of national security. Until the Presidency was formed on 12 May 1992, the National Security Council was effectively the main body of authority in the Serbian republic.

3. The National Security Council exercised its authority on 15 April 1992 when it recommended an immediate threat of war be declared. That same day, signing as the Presidency, Biljana PLAVSIC and Nikola KOLJEVIC, declared the imminent threat of war and ordered the mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence.

4. On 12 May 1992 Radovan KARADZIC became a member of the three-member Presidency. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected President of the Presidency. On or about 2 June 1992 the Presidency was formally expanded to include Momcilo KRAJISNIK and the President of the Government. From 12 May to 17 December 1992 the Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the Bosnian Serb army in peace and war and of the Bosnian Serb police forces in war and other emergency situations. The Presidency decided on the deployment of the army in war; appointed, promoted and discharged officers of the army of the Bosnian Serb republic (hereafter VRS). In addition the Presidency received reports on the activities of units under its command.

5. During the period 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces, SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, to execute the crimes alleged within this indictment. In some instances, with the support and encouragement of Radovan KARADZIC and others, the Bosnian Serb forces, SDS and governmental institutions acted in concert with forces from the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

6. On 17 December 1992 the Presidency was disbanded and Radovan KARADZIC was elected sole President of the Serbian republic. (Republika Srpska).

62. Further, from 1 January 1993 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, mainly through his positions as President of the SDS, including President of the Main Board; President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic, President of Republika Srpska and Supreme Commander of the armed forces; Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, directed and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:

1. From 17 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika Srpska and assumed all the powers of the Presidency, including that of Supreme Commander of the armed forces, as more fully set out in paragraph 61 (d). As Supreme Commander, Radovan KARADZIC, acting in concert with other members of the Supreme Command, commanded the armed forces.

2. During the period 1 January 1993 to 30 November 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces, SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, to execute the crimes alleged within this indictment.

63. In October and November 1991 the Bosnian Serb Assembly also authorised Radovan KARADZIC, Biljana PLAVSIC and other leading members of the SDS to "represent and protect the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina vis-à-vis federal and international bodies;" and to negotiate with Muslim and Croatian representatives on the organisation of future common life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

64. Radovan KARADZIC, both through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, also had the authority to punish or to initiate investigations or proceedings against any persons or members of the armed forces under his command who were believed to have committed crimes on the territory of the Serbian republic.

65. Therefore, between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, both through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under the Bosnian Serb leadership direction and control; were committing the crimes alleged in this indictment or had done so, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

66. In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC both through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under the Bosnian Serb leadership direction and control had committed the crimes alleged in this indictment, and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

67. All acts or omissions charged as Genocide or Complicity in Genocide, were committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

68. All acts and omissions charged as Crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and/or other non-Serb civilian populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

69. From 6 April 1992, a state of international armed conflict and partial occupation existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

70. All acts and omissions charged as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ("grave breaches") occurred during the international armed conflict and partial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

71. Radovan KARADZIC was required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols thereto.

72. Radovan KARADZIC is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal Statute.

73. Radovan KARADZIC while holding the positions of superior authority as set out in the foregoing paragraphs, is also criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

ADDITIONAL FACTS

74. The SDS was one of the three ethnically oriented parties that emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 in preparation for multi-party elections to be held in November of that year. From its inception, Radovan KARADZIC was the SDS party’s president, whilst Biljana PLAVSIC and Momcilo KRAJISNIK were leading party members. Each of the three parties was aligned with one of the three principal ethnic groups in Bosnia: the SDS was the principal Serb national party; the Party of Democratic Action (hereafter SDA) was the main Bosnian Muslim national party; the Croatian Democratic Community (hereafter HDZ) was the leading Croat national party. The results of the elections reflected the dominance of these three main national parties. At the Republic level, the SDA won the most seats in the Assembly, followed by the SDS and then the HDZ. The remaining seats were split between other parties, including the former Communist Party.

75. The central idea within the SDS political platform, as articulated by its leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, was the unity of all Serbs within Yugoslavia as the only way of protecting the Serbian national interests. This idea was related to the concept of a "Greater Serbia" which began to openly circulate in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) in the late 1980s. The SDS regarded the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federal Yugoslav system as a threat to the interests of the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

76. The results of the November 1990 elections meant that, as time went on, the SDS would have had insufficient political authority to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia through democratic political processes. In the spring of 1991 the SDS began to organise certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina into formal regional structures through the concept of "Associations of Municipalities" which existed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional regime.

77. Parallel to its organisational structure, which covered republic, regional, municipal and local community levels, in 1991 the SDS leadership developed a closed, covert internal system of command, control and communications. In this system, the main authority belonged to the central SDS party organs and, in particular, to the President and the Main Board of the party, thus ensuring complete control by the party’s leadership.

78. In late June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in Slovenia and Croatia after the two republics declared independence on 25 June. The JNA withdrew from Slovenia after a very short period, allowing for its secession from the SFRY. In Croatia, however, the fighting continued throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1991.

79. For the war in Croatia, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the male population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These orders were opposed by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which issued orders to the population that they did not have to respond to the mobilisation. As a result, very few Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats answered the call-up. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs responded in large numbers, exhorted to do so by the SDS.

80. As the war in Croatia continued, it appeared increasingly likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina would also declare its independence from the SFRY. The SDS however, wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia. As it became clear that they would not be able to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Yugoslav federation, the SDS began in earnest the creation of a separate Serbian territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By September 1991 the SDS proclaimed one Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb Autonomous Districts (hereafter SAOs). The SAOs became the first territorial foundation on which the Serbian republic was to be founded.

81. As viewed by the SDS leaders, a major problem in the creation and control of Serbian territory was the significant Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations that lived in areas the SDS claimed. Thus, a significant aspect of the plan to create a new Serbian state was the permanent removal or "ethnic cleansing" of nearly all of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations from those areas, allowing for the presence of only a small number of non-Serbs who would agree to the conditions for living in a Serb-dominated State.

82. In the autumn of 1991, the JNA began to withdraw its forces out of Croatia and re-deploy them in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Working in conjunction with certain elements in the JNA, the SDS began to covertly arm the Bosnian Serb civilian population.

83. A separate Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the SDS, was founded on 24 October 1991 as the highest representative and legislative organ of Serbs in Bosnia.

84. In late December 1991 the leaders of the SDS began preparations for the physical take-over of power in those municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs did not have clear control, and for the subsequent implementation of a general plan for ethnically cleansing the areas they considered to be Serbian. The take-overs were executed following instructions issued by the SDS leadership, often through Crisis Staffs that were brought into being for this purpose.

85. The Crisis Staff was modelled on an entity that had existed as part of the defence system in the SFRY, and was designated to take over the functioning of the municipalities or republic government, as the case may have been, during times of war or a state of emergency when the Assembly, normally the highest authority of government, would not have been able to function.

86. The Crisis Staffs began functioning in SDS-claimed municipalities in late December 1991. They operated at both the regional and municipal levels of authority as the bodies that would be responsible for the co-ordination of the execution of most of the operational phase of the plan for ethnic cleansing.

87. On 31 May and 10 June 1992, the Presidency ordered the re-designation of the Crisis Staffs as War Presidencies and then War Commissions in the municipalities. The War Presidencies/War Commissions maintained the same structure and virtually the same authority as the Crisis Staffs, and were still commonly referred to by the public as Crisis Staffs.

88. The Crisis Staffs were to cease operation when the Assemblies were able to meet or to conduct business again. The regular municipal organs would then resume operation, generally under the direction of the same SDS leaders. These municipal organs then approved or validated the actions of the Crisis Staffs.

89. On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the "Serbian republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". The territory of that republic was declared to include "the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two," and it was declared to be part of the Yugoslav federal state.

90. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began to seize physical control of ethnically mixed municipalities that had been declared part of the Serbian state, including but not limited to the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a similar, co-ordinated and planned manner. The attacks, take-overs and subsequent events were planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, War Commissions and other SDS and government authorities acting under the control and direction of the SDS leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC.

91. Also on 12 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to create the VRS, effectively transforming the JNA units remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other armed forces working in concert in Bosnia and Herzegovina into commands of the new army. The Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed Ratko MLADIC as Commander of the VRS Main Staff. In this capacity Ratko MLADIC was directly subordinate to the Presidency.

92. The JNA "officially" withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, but military operations directed against the non-Serb population continued to be carried out by the VRS and Bosnian Serb police. The JNA, which had been re-named the Yugoslav Army (hereafter VJ) during the SFRY’s reconstitution as the FRY in April 1992, continued to have strong links with the VRS. It provided critical combat, financial, and logistic support to the Bosnian Serb military effort. Many officers, commanders, soldiers, logistical centres and much equipment and supplies of the former JNA was left behind for Bosnian Serb use. Former JNA officers were transferred from their posts in JNA units to the same unit’s VRS successor and most remained in command of those units throughout the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The salaries of VRS officers continued to be paid by Belgrade. Additionally, from time to time after 19 May 1992, elements of the VJ had a direct role in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided critical combat support to the VRS.

_____________________
Carla Del Ponte
Prosecutor

Dated this 28th day of April 2000
At The Hague,
The Netherlands

Case Information Sheet